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Abstract
Nowadays, privacy has become a very serious issue with
smart and mobile platforms. Users tend to allow intru-
sive apps access much sensible information without really
knowing the potential threats. To solve this issue several
solutions (e.g. GDPR) have been provided. Our claim
is that the users currently are not sufficiently involved in
this process for being able to use such solutions. To do
this we developed an application that provides a form of
awareness to the users and we asked them to reply a set of
questions. Our conclusions are that users must be better
informed of the risks and value of their personal informa-
tion.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, smartphone applications have con-
tributed greatly to the quality of users experience in their
smart devices allowing them to reach a huge set of func-
tionalities even bigger when the user?s personal informa-
tion are used At the same time, however, many applica-
tions fail to guarantee any kind of user privacy; this is
especially true for Android1 smartphones where the Ap-
plication Market is self-regulated.
The mechanism that Android offers to increase user pri-
vacy is the use of system permissions: every time an app
1http://www.android.com
is downloaded from the market and the installation pro-
cess is started, Android controls the app?s permissions
and then asks the user whether she is willing to allow
the app to use that set of permissions. If the user does
not agree, the installation process is interrupted. This sys-
tem allows users to know what information is used and
which entity processes it, but it does not indicate when
and how the information is used inside an application. For
instance, if an application proposes a game that uses sen-
sor data and secretly records it, the sensor data could be
used for malicious intents without the user?s knowledge.
Novel regulations (i.e. GDPR) requires that the user
is informed about the data access and collection by the
app. However, it is our claim that users are not informed
enough to decide whether a data access in an app is a po-
tential threat or not.
With this work, we perform a measurement of the
user’s impact of a users awareness campaign about the
potential risks of the app he/she has installed in their own
smart devices.
We developed an Android application that monitors the
behavior of the other apps installed on the user’s device.
The app also provides two distinct interaction with the
device owner:
• It informs the owner about a potential risk a given
app has considering a specific permission.
• It asks the user if he/she knows those risks and (in
case he didn’t) if his/her perception of the app is
changed.
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(a) App Main Windows, it allows the user to configure the app
based on her personal needs. A delete button allows the user to
delete the app and also erase all her data remotely in order to
maintain full anonymization.
(b) Question Windows, it shows the user a set of information
about the behavior of the app and it asks a set of questions to
the user.
Figure 1: PrintScreen of the two key windows of the application.
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We perform the first round of experiments with a se-
lected group of 17 users in order to obtain a first idea of
the data we will be able to collect on a larger scale.
2 Related work
Privacy has been a hot topic in several domains and has
been approached in different ways.
In the context of smart and mobile devices, several
key works have been proposed during the past years.
Langheinrich et. al. in [1] defines a set of challenges
that any Ubiquitous/Pervasive application must satisfy in
order to be privacy-save. They can be resumed in the fol-
lowing list:
• Principle of Openness or simply Notice: users
should be aware of the nature of the data shared.
• Choice and Consent: where users can choose to of-
fer that information to the requester and they have to
give explicit consent.
• Anonymity and Pseudonymity: Anonymization can
be defined as the state of being not identifiable within
a set of subjects.
• Proximity and Locality: in essence it expresses the
fact that information must not be disseminated indef-
initely, not even across a larger geographic boundary.
• Adequate Security: Network and disk security are
fundamental.
• Access and Recourse: provide mechanisms for ac-
cess and regulation. Eventually, also penalties if
someone break the rules.
Notable work on smart devices has been performed by
William et. al. on [2] provides TaintDroid, a tool to track
and monitor sensible information inside an application.
The idea is to extend and mark each point where sensi-
ble information is used inside the application and track
such points at runtime. It is shown that there exist 68 in-
stances of information misuses in 20 out of 30 popular
applications downloaded from the market, thus confirm-
ing the need for efficient and easily deployable privacy-
preserving techniques.
A possible solution to this problem has been proposed
by Ferrari et. al. in [3] where authors propose Mock-
ingdroid. Mocking is a traditional technique in software
testing; its main goal is to mimic the real object behavior
in a controllable way. Recently, mocking techniques have
been used in mobile environments to increase the user pri-
vacy and their goal is to allow users to select the kind of
information they want to pass to the application (if real or
randomly generated). The Mockingbird framework is a
solution to mocking that uses recorded context-traces in-
stead of randomly generated data, which is easily detected
by applications. We also propose a flexible methodology
to mock an Android application that does not require any
changes at the operating system level and at the virtual
machine level. Mockingbird is a very promising solution;
we are currently testing its performance and increasing its
functionality
Many of those principles are nowadays included in
the law, for instance, the European Data Protection Law
(GDPR) 2 forces the concepts of ?Privacy by Design? and
?Privacy by Default? in its regulation. Privacy By De-
sign means data protection through technology design” in
other words the fact that data protection techniques are
already integrated into the data processing with final goal
minimize privacy risks through technical and governance
controls. Privacy by default means that when a system or
service includes choices for the individual on how much
personal data he/she shares with others, the default set-
tings should be the most privacy-friendly ones.
Even though a valid set of legal tools are nowadays
available to the user is our claim that the lack of knowl-
edge of the potential risks related to data access in mobile
smart devices makes them less effective. To this extent,
we provide the following study that has a final goal to
demonstrate that users must be better informed.
3 Study Definition and data collec-
tion
Our goal is to study the privacy perception in the device
owned by a group of selected users. To this extent, we
develop and Android Application 1 that has as goal the
measurement of the key elements:
2https://www.eugdpr.org/
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• The ”privacy level” of the apps installed on the
users’ device: we collect the Permission granted to
the app by the user and classify them according to
the level of risk.
• The level of user awareness: periodically we show
to the user a potential risk connected to the data ac-
cess for a given app (if there is any) and ask if is
aware of that and if with this information his/her per-
ception of the app is changed (in terms of safety).
3.1 Security-Percepetion App
The app is built for the Android operating system and it is
composed of three key entities:
• Background Service: it collects the following in-
formation:
– List of the application installed in the devices
and the permissions allowed by the users.
– Application in execution in a specific time in-
terval.
– System status (CPU / Memory) and context in-
formation (location and user’s activity) and it
triggers the request for users input.
• Main Window 1a: it allows the user to configure
the system settings. In other words, the users is able
to decide whether to collect information or not and
the time he/she are willing to answer our questions.
This activity also allows the user to delete the appli-
cation and all the information we store from him in a
privacy-safe manner.
• Awareness Window 1b: periodically the user re-
ceives an information about the behavior of one of
the applications installed on his/her phone and, af-
terward, he/she also receives the request to answer a
question about its perception on a given application
installed on his/her phone.
All the information are anonymized and the user is only
identifiable by its unique device id. The delete procedure
is also secure because we allowed the user to delete all
his/her information by the app thus without making any
connection between user and user-id.
During the first run, we ask the user their profile in the
form of the age range, gender, and IT knowledge.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the number of permissions per
app classified as dangerous.
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To make the user aware we focus our attention on the
permissions the user grant to the application on its phone.
To define the risk of the permission we use the categoriza-
tion provided by the Android developers team 3 where a
pre-defined set of permissions are labeled as ’Protection
level: dangerous’. In order to give an awareness to the
user, we show them the application, the permissions it ac-
cess and a text that describes the overall goal of that per-
mission and the potential risks.
To measure the impact of our awareness we ask to
every time he sees the awareness two key questions:
• Do you know that this app access that information?
• In case you don’t know; has your perception of the
app changed?
These questions allow us to measure if the user is aware
of the app dangerous data access (maybe because the app
need that information) and also to measure the impact of
our awareness with the help of the second question.
4 Experiments and key findings
Our claim is that the users are not enough aware of the
behavior of their application. Users pay very little atten-
tion to the data request made by the app, many reasons
are behind this behavior but we believe that the lack of
knowledge of the risks is one of the key elements.
To prove our claim we ask 17 subjects to use our app
and answer as much question as they can. The user pro-
files are shown in Table 1, we see that they span across
different ages, gender and it knowledge making the set
we collected heterogeneous.
The next analysis we performed is connected to the
dangerous permissions required by the app installed on
the users’ phones. In Figure ?? is shown the distribution.
We clearly see that the majority of the app requires num-
bers of permission between 0 and 7 with mean 4. How-
ever, there are a group of outliers that requires an aston-
ishing number of dangerous permission up to 16.
The key outcome of this first analysis is that the pri-
vacy of user sensible information may be endangered by
3https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html
Aware 41%
Not Aware 59%
(a) Answers on which the user is aware of the app access [%]
Changed 81%
(b) Changes in perception after the awareness phase [%]
Figure 3: Aggregate outcome of the users’ answers.
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the majority of application he/she has installed in his/her
mobile device.
As said before, to determine if the user is aware of
the potential risks the app he/she has installed in his/her
phone we provide an awareness in the form of a notifi-
cation of a potential risk in a given application when we
notice the application is under execution. The notification
contains the app name, the permission it access and a list
of potential risks connected to this access.
Age 31 - 40: 8 41 - 50: 4 18 - 30: 7
Gender Female: 6 Male: 11
It Advanced: 11 Some: 5 None: 3
Table 1: User profile categorizations.
To measure the impact of the awareness we asked the
user to reply to key questions; if he/she was aware of the
app dangerous accesses, and, in case he was not aware
of that, if his/her perception of the app has changed. We
clearly see that in the majority of the cases (more than
60%) the user has no idea of the risks connected to that
app.
Another important measure is to determine if the
awareness has an impact on the users; to do so we asked
the users if his/her perception has changed in the case of
a successful awareness. The outcome is presented in Fig-
ure ??; there, the results show that in the circumstance
the user is well informed he/she is able to recognize the
potential threats in the app and therefore he/she changed
his/her perception of the app.
5 Conclusions and future work
With this work, we provide a first study on the perception
of privacy in users of mobile smart devices. We develop
an app that studies the permissions of the other apps in-
stalled on a smart device and if those app access data that
may lead to privacy damages we informed the users with
our awareness campaign. To measure the impact of the
awareness we asked two questions to the users that let us
understand if the users are aware or not to the risks con-
nected to the apps data access and, in case he/she is not
aware of that we asked if his/her perception of the app is
changed.
Currently, we made an experiment with 17 users to
have a first idea of the data we may be able to collect. The
user has been selected to be heterogeneously and from the
results, we clearly depict the fact that a better awareness
must be presented to the users before providing techno-
logical and legal solutions.
As future work, we plan to extend our analysis includ-
ing more users and also study the relationship between
user profile and impact of the awareness by collecting the
information about changes in permissions grants and in-
stall/uninstall of the application in the users’ devices.
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